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Abstract
This article uses the World Bank’s Doing Business project to illuminate the politics of
“governance by knowledge.” It synthesizes scholarship critiquing the project’s legitimacy and
contributes to research challenging the instrumental benefits of improved Doing Business
performance. The article’s major contribution is an immanent critique of Legal Origins Theory,
which was developed largely to provide ex post validation for the project’s core claims, but
whose premises, when taken seriously, lead to conclusions that contradict its “one-size-fits-all”
logic. The article demonstrates much can be learned about the politics of development by
engaging rationalizations of power on their own terms.
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Introduction
The World Bank’s Doing Business project (DB) offers a fascinating case study in the politics of
“governance by knowledge” in development. Every year, DB produces eleven numerical
indicators, offering a “snapshot” (Perry-Kessaris 2017, 500–502) of business regulations in 190
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countries, on themes ranging from access to electricity to conditions of employment. The
project’s hallmark is its ranking of countries by a weighted aggregate of indicator scores. Its
annual reports, which publish updated rankings and scores, also give explicit expression to
imperatives already tacit in the rankings: reallocate legal rights and reform regulatory practices
to push each indicator score as high (or, occasionally, as low) as possible. Though its publicfacing communications cast it as an exercise in measuring business regulations, it has long been
clear that DB functions, as intended, as a governance project (Davis and Kruse 2007, 1098).
Indeed, it is an archetype of governance by indicator (Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012). It is
also, arguably, today’s most influential global law reform project (Broome, Homolar, and
Kranke 2018).
This article draws from and contributes to two lines of scholarship on DB’s logic, function, and
impact. On the one hand, a line of governance scholarship has sought both to reveal how DB
power is constituted and exercised, and to put the legitimacy of that power in question. By
engaging with that literature’s key claims from the perspective of national policy-makers, the
first section below argues that existing DB governance scholarship gives insufficient credence to
a core source of the project’s power: the promise that conformity with its guidance will produce
predictable economic benefits, based on plausible appeals to objective, scientific knowledge.
The article’s next section turns to DB methodology scholarship, which has been concerned
precisely with the validity of the project’s data, methods, and conclusions about the instrumental
benefits of prescribed reforms. The section begins by linking DB’s “one size fits all” guidance on
business regulation to claims that indicated reforms will predictably result in specifiable, uniform
economic effects. Those claims have sometimes been advanced based on intuitive, verbal
arguments about how laws structure economic incentives. More often, and more fundamentally,
they have been grounded in data showing that DB indicators are correlated with salutary
economic outcomes and statistical studies leveraging variations in national “legal origin” to give
those correlations a causal interpretation. Existing methodology scholarship has established that
neither of these methods provide sufficient warrant for DB’s causal claims—nor for its guidance.
These prior findings turn out not to be dispositive of the validity of DB knowledge claims.
Between 1998 and 2008, the authors of the original legal origin studies developed a Legal
Origins Theory (LOT) a richer account specifically intended to bolster DB’s causal claims (La

Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). While extensive literature has sought to revise,
reconstruct, or reject LOT as a model of relationships between legal and economic change
(Deakin and Pistor 2012b), existing studies have not carefully distinguished LOT from the
premises in the original legal origin studies, nor directly addressed whether LOT can validate
DB’s causal claims. The critique of legal origins theory in the article’s third section makes a
unique contribution to existing LOT scholarship; it shows that, when LOT’s suppositions and
evidence are taken seriously, its conclusions contradict DB’s fundamental premise that “one size
fits all” in business regulation. In doing so, it also fills a gap in the DB methodology scholarship.
Beyond its contributions to scholarship on LOT and the validity of DB methods and knowledge
claims, the article models a methodological strategy for understanding and critiquing the
operation of governance by knowledge (McHugh-Russell 2019) and the contemporary politics of
development. Like prior DB governance scholarship, it seeks to expose the project’s
“governmentality”—its “styles of thought, conditions of formation, the principles and
knowledges [it] borrow[s] from and generate[s], the practices [it] consist[s] of, how they are
carried out, their contestations and alliances with other arts of governing” (Rose, O’Malley, and
Valverde 2006). Its engagement with LOT draws from scholarship that looks behind economic
knowledge to understand the complex matrix of practices (tools, techniques, methods) and
artefacts (materials, data) through which such knowledge is produced (Schabas 2002; Morgan
2012). More pointedly, the article engages in immanent critique. Unlike external critique, which
evaluates an object’s legitimacy (or coherence, validity, credibility etc.) using norms and frames
external to the object, immanent critique “…judges the object by reference to its own standards”
(Marks 2000, 25). That orientation informs this article in two ways.
DB governance scholarship has tended to emphasize the gap between the actual operation of the
project’s authority and the instrumental rationales expressed in the project’s annual reports. Like
Marxist critiques of ideology, this scholarship is informed by a concern that illegitimate power
relations can be reproduced and maintained by naturalization, normalization, reification, and
simplification—and, ultimately, by dissimulation (Marks 2000, chap. 1). Yet as Marks (2000,
19) has emphasized, power relations can also be maintained by “...rationalization…the
construction of chains of reasoning of which [particular social and political arrangements] are the
logical conclusion.” This article takes DB’s principals and champions at their word, that the

project’s authority rests on the epistemic validity of its claims that DB indicators provide
predictable means to achieve specified economic ends.
DB methodology scholarship has sought to highlight flawed measurements, expose inadequate
evidence, or show how other frames conform better to available data. In other words, it has
judged DB against its own epistemic standards. But an external element remains, insofar as this
scholarship has focused on errors in the application of DB reasoning to individual cases, rather
than targeting the reasoning itself.i My approach, which bears some resemblance to methods
critical legal scholars have described as “deconstruction” (McCluskey 2005; Kennedy 2001,
1178–82), is best seen as an example of what Kelman (1984, 293) called “trashing”: “Take
specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actually foolish ([tragi]comic); and [only] then look for some (external observer's) order…in the internally
contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed.”
The conclusion summarizes findings on the economic effect of DB-indicated reforms, considers
rationales for conformity with DB guidance that lie beyond DB’s causal claims, and addresses
the capacities and limits of immanent critique to help understand the global politics of
development.

Limits of existing DB governance scholarship and the power of instrumental knowledge
DB governance scholarship has produced invaluable insights for those who hope to participate
in, and challenge, contemporary modes of global governance. Yet if we take the global context
as a given constraint, and approach this scholarship’s key critiques from the perspective of the
project’s putative subjects—the government actors, especially in developing countries, with a
mandate to shape business regulations—it becomes clear those insights are not enough to dispel
the project’s power.
First, the indicators are “socially constructed and, therefore, contingent and provisional” (PerryKessaris 2017, 498–99). Yet this does not make them subjective. DB’s advantage over earlier
projects to quantitatively compare national legal systems lies in how it “take[s] the measure of
the law” (Pistor 2012; Davis and Kruse 2007, 1098–1100). DB indicators are calculated, in part,
based on whether national law grants certain mandatory rights to specific actors. For example,

the Protecting Minority Investors indicator is higher when 10% of shareholders in a publicly
traded company can force an extraordinary meeting of shareholders. Primarily, however,
indicators are based on the estimated time, cost, or number of steps involved in conducting a
given regulatory, administrative, or legal task. The Paying Taxes indicator, for example,
comprises both tax rates on profits and annual time spent on preparing taxes. Higher indicator
scores are given for lower costs, fewer procedures, and stronger rights for favoured actors. The
indicators are based on the interpretation of official texts and documents by experts, rather than
the actual experience of business actors. Nonetheless, compared to prior projects to measure
country legal systems (Deakin and Pistor 2012b, x), the indicators possess a high level of what
Porter (1995) calls “mechanical” objectivity: though they integrate some expert judgement,
indicator scores are built through relatively clear rules which would allow others to reproduce
results.
Second, DB is value-laden (Krever 2013; Broome, Homolar, and Kranke 2018), not least
because prioritising DB concerns involves policy trade-offs (Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019).
DB reproduces a “neoliberal,” deregulatory development orthodoxy and has clear affinities with
the Bank’s “investment climate” agenda (Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019; Krever 2013;
McCormack 2018; Perry-Kessaris 2011; 2017, 506–7; Schueth 2015, 151). Indicators like DB
work in part through a logic of normalization and naturalization that obscures the partiality of the
values they advance (Krever 2013, 131–32; Perry-Kessaris 2011, 416; Van Den Meerssche
2018). Yet DB does not tie the validity of its indicators to any putative value-neutrality but,
contrariwise, to the instrumental value produced by correctly manipulating them. Just as DB
grounds the credibility of its indicators in their methods of production, it stakes their relevance
primarily on claims that improving indicator performance will advance various economic goals.
As put by the Bank-commissioned Independent Evaluation Group (2008, xv), DB is “anchored
in research that links characteristics of a country’s business environment to firm performance,
and thence to macroeconomic outcomes.”
Third, DB indicators simplify a complex reality and, in their narrow, selective choice of inputs
(Broome, Homolar, and Kranke 2018), do not quite measure what they name (McCormack 2018;
Broome, Homolar, and Kranke 2018, 519). By “measuring the wrong things” (Perry-Kessaris
2017, 505), they “reproduce distorted images of the world” (Broome, Homolar, and Kranke

2018, 516). Yet indicator correspondence with legal reality is of minimal relevance to
policymakers. Other ways of looking at national laws may be more precise, comprehensive, or
sophisticated. But that does not make DB indicators arbitrary. They are anchored by their
incorporation into DB’s assemblage of data, claims and arguments concerning the effects of legal
means on economic ends. For policymakers, what the indicators “actually measure” is moot:
what matters is what manipulating them can achieve.
Fourth, DB intervenes in a global political economy of what counts as “significant” (PerryKessaris 2011, 415–16; 2017, 499, 502). By circulating standards of performance for countries
and political actors, it shapes strategies for the accumulation of “symbolic capital” which incites
a reflexive dynamic of status competition (Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019). It thereby creates
a risk of incentivizing paper reforms that have minimal practical impact (Hallward-Driemeier
and Pritchett 2015; McCormack 2018, 650). Of course, for policymakers who are motivated by
status and prestige, these claims favour conformity with DB guidance, including by “gaming”
the measurements. For those with only their country’s best interests in mind, the supposed
economic benefits of good faith DB reforms should make bad faith reforms in other countries
irrelevant.

Evaluating the instrumental rationale of DB guidance
For policymakers, then, the key concern is not the legitimacy of DB power, but the validity of
claims about the instrumental value of its guidance. Assessing those claims must begin with a
clear articulation of their causal logic.
The causal logic of Doing Business claims: “one size fits all”
Milhaupt and Pistor (2008, 5) have suggested that DB’s methodological architecture embodies a
simplistic, “prevailing view” of the relationship between law and economic development,
namely:
good law + good enforcement = good economic outcomes.
Beyond Weber’s idea, central to the first “moment” of law and development in the 1960s, that
formal legal rationality is critical to the establishment of capitalism, beyond Hayek’s valorization
of legal property rights as the key determinant of successful economies, and beyond even

North’s (1990) new institutionalist updating of those precursors (see Thomas 2011, 973–83), this
view suggests that specific legal rules and practices are “a kind of technology that can be inserted
in the proper places—and imported from abroad when necessary” to achieve desired economic
ends (Milhaupt and Pistor 2008, 5). Though legal scholars have fulminated against such a
modular, technical view of legal practices, working to pin down “what really works” in law for
development remains a popular genre (e.g. Lee 2019).
DB guidance embodies a markedly blunt version of the prevailing view. Law and development
orthodoxy long ago moved beyond the banality that “law matters” (Faure and Smits 2011) to an
appreciation of context, complementarity, and path dependency in identifying the “proper
places” for rules and regimes (Rodrik 2007; Ahlering and Deakin 2007). Since its founding, by
contrast, DB has cleaved to a “cookie cutter” approach (Anghie 2005, 259) to using law to
achieve economic ends. Though the project is no longer as explicit as its first annual report that
“one size often fits all” (World Bank 2004, xvi), the premise is baked into the logic of the
country score, and tacit in the meaning its reports give to “improvement,” “performance” and
“better” regulation (World Bank 2020, 2-5). Regardless of a country’s characteristics, it means
equating its ideal regulations with the practices of the top scorer for each indicator.
How has the Bank rationalized this approach?
Defective verbal arguments
One mode of justification has involved intuitive, verbal arguments about how institutions shape
incentives. For the set of sub-indicators that can take on an arbitrarily large value, like the
number of days it takes to connect to an electricity supplier, a relatively small value is clearly
preferable, all else considered. Yet DB relies on the fallacious reasoning that, because some of a
thing is good for business (or that too much is bad), it would be best to have as much (or as little)
as possible (Arruñada 2009; 2007).
Protecting Minority Investors offers an illuminating example. The indicator embodies a familiar
argument about the benefits of bolstering shareholder protection: the greater an investor’s
confidence that promised returns will be realized, the more they will be willing to invest.
Inasmuch as legal protection of their interests will increase such confidence, the argument goes,
it will also boost total investment (La Porta et al. 1998). Notably, the locus classicus of this

argument (Jensen and Meckling 1976) did not suggest that strengthening investor rights will
invariably increase investment. Rather, it identified a trade off: transferring power to investors
increases their willingness to invest, but also raises the cost of production for managers.
Law-and-economics scholars long believed this trade-off was best managed by the private
decisions made between shareholders and firm insiders, and that shareholders should benefit
from no special legal protection (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Easterbrook and Fischel 1996)
Today’s scholarly consensus sees the right balance as including some mandatory law. The issue
is how much (and what kind of) mandatory shareholder protection will tend to promote financial
development or maximize welfare (Coffee Jr 1999). Yet the thrust of the Protecting Minority
Investors indicator is that increasing shareholder power will always benefit firms and economies.
It may be that the specific combination of mandatory corporate law rules privileged by DB will
have a salutary effect on financial markets. But that can only be shown through careful empirical
investigation.
Shaky statistical grounds
As it turns out, DB has always advanced its guidance largely on empirical studies tracking the
economic import of its indicators. In terms of how well that research corroborates DB guidance,
the eleven indicators ii can be divided into four groups (see Table 1). Two depend entirely on the
intuitive case critiqued above. The remainder have been advanced based on a demonstrated
correlation between “better” scores and specific economic outcomes.

Table 1 Scientific basis and causal argument underlying the advancement of the 2019 Doing Business indicators.
Causationb

Additional notes

Trading across Borders (Djankov, Freund, and Pham 2010)

Other

Includes robust causal argument, using a different
instrumental variable

Protecting Minority
Investors

(Djankov, LaPorta, et al. 2008)

Legal Origin

Originally called ‘Protecting Investors’

Resolving Insolvency

(Djankov, Hart, et al. 2008)

Legal Origin

Originally called ‘Closing a Business’

Getting Credit

(Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007)

Legal Origin

Originally based in part on (La Porta et al. 1998)

Employing Workers

(Botero et al. 2004)

Legal Origin

Originally ‘Hiring and Firing Workers’

Enforcing a Contract

(Djankov, La Porta, et al. 2003)

Legal Origin

Starting a Business

(Djankov et al. 2002)

Legal Origin

Getting Electricity

(Geginat and Ramalho 2018)

None

Paying Taxes

(Djankov et al. 2010)

None

Registering Property

None.

N/A

No study ever published, though one was planned
(World Bank 2005, 83);
Has clear links with De Soto’s (1989) work on
registering property

Dealing with
Construction Permits

None

N/A

Originally called ‘Dealing with Licenses’

Indicator

Scientific basisa

Documenting numerous correlations with
desirable economic outcomes but no effort at
causal inference

Notes: a published research backing up economic relevance of the indicator. b indicates the argument used in that research to
characterize any documented links between the indicator and economic variables as causal. Sources: “Data Notes” (World Bank
2004, 107–14; 2018b, 73–125); Methodology <www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology> and Changes to Methodology
<www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology/changes-to-the-methodology> pages on the Doing Business project website.

Causation cannot be inferred from correlation alone. Observed associations are compatible with
two alternative explanations: it may be that the economic outcomes engender the legal change, or
that changes in both variables share a common causal factor. For two further indicators, the
causal interpretation of the identified correlations was never justified. For example, while
improvements in the Getting Electricity indicator were shown to be correlated with reduced
bribes in the electricity sector (Geginat and Ramalho 2018), no evidence was offered that
changing the former would have an impact on the latter.
The remaining seven indicators are linked to research which shows a correlation between better
scores and salutary economic variables, and which offers an empirically grounded account of
why that correlation should be given a casual interpretation. For six of those seven—i.e., the
majority of DB indicators—policy relevance is tied to the legal origins method pioneered in La
Porta et al (1997; 1998). This is no coincidence. Andrei Shleifer was not only central to the
development of the legal origins method, the elaboration of “legal origins theory” analysed
below, and the design of DB’s methodology, but was also the only participant in all three
(Djankov 2016; McHugh-Russell 2019a). For the sake of convenience, Shleifer is therefore used
below as a surrogate for the entire intellectual networks behind these projects.
The cornerstone of the legal origins method is the grouping of countries by their “legal origin,”
that is, the historical legal tradition that most shaped their present legal system. Insofar as
national legal systems were generally founded decades or centuries ago, legal origin can be
treated as an exogenous input into current legal and economic arrangements, making it eligible
as an instrumental variable for the purpose of causal inference (La Porta et al. 1998, 1126; La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 286; Deakin and Pistor 2012a, xi).

Legal Origins Theory: rehabilitating DB causal inference?
In light of extensive critiques (Davis and Kruse 2007, 1112–14; Helland and Klick 2011; Deakin
and Pistor 2012a, xi; Spamann 2015, 142), Shleifer eventually admitted that the direction of
causation between economic outcomes and legal variables cannot be determined by using legal
origin as an instrumental variable (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 291, 293–94).
That was not the end of the matter. In a 2008 article, Shleifer sought to consolidate the extensive

body of “legal origin”-inspired research under an overarching interpretive frame (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 285).
Broadly interpreted, the article culminated a project to develop a free-standing “Legal Origins
Theory” (LOT). Though legal origins failed as a linchpin for statistical techniques to substantiate
the economic effect of legal reforms, its economic salience is hard to deny. In fact, many
economic variables correlate more strongly with legal origins than with the legal variables
tracked in Shleifer’s original studies (Michaels 2009, 768–69). LOT was thus informed by a
desire to explain how and why the founding moments of national legal systems seem to leave
such a lasting mark both on legal conventions and on economic relations. Yet LOT was also
specifically intended to rehabilitate the claim that the correlations between DB indicators and
economic outcomes could be interpreted causally (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
2008, 287, 291–98, 323–26).
Read together, the 2008 article and its precursors offer a rich account of the relations between
legal systems, legal rules, economic institutions—and their co-evolution over time. While a host
of studies have critiqued Shleifer’s theories, none have carefully distinguished LOT from the thin
premises that originally motivated the use of legal origins as an instrumental variable. The
remainder of this section develops an immanent critique of LOT, making a good faith effort at
reconstruction by exploring interpretations that give this scholarship the best chance to succeed.
To know whether LOT successfully buttressed DB’s causal claims—and thus whether the
project’s authority has any legitimate grounds—LOT must be taken seriously on its own terms.
The basic model: New Comparative Economics
Reconstruction starts with what Shleifer dubbed New Comparative Economics (“NCE”). At the
core of the NCE framework is an approach to institutional efficiency that uses market
equilibrium with perfect property rights as a normative benchmark. Private decisions made in
light of mismatches between the controllers and beneficiaries of resources lead to allocations that
fall short of a Kaldor–Hicks optimum—shortfalls often labelled “social costs” (Coase 1960).
Institutions limit but do not eliminate these costs. The NCE framework represents institutional
alternatives as distinct locations in a two-dimensional space of such social costs: “disorder”
costs, attributable to the risk of appropriation by other private actors, and “dictatorship” costs,
linked to the risk of expropriation by state agents (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 597–600).

Under this representation, an economic problem will have a set of quasi-efficient institutional
solutions—an “Institutional Possibility Frontier” (IPF)—for which disorder costs cannot be
reduced without increasing dictatorship costs, nor vice versa (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 598–
99). In Figure 1, the IPF curve runs from “private orderings” to “state ownership.” The NCE
model further assumes that societies end up with an institution lying on the IPF, and that the IPF
is a smooth curve with a clear path between institutional solutions. The result is a radical
simplification of comparative institutional analysis: with most of the universe of institutional
forms precluded, comparisons boil down to a one-dimensional trade-off of disorder costs against
dictatorship costs (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 598–99; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer 2008, 307). While Shleifer characterized the institutional alternatives in terms of degree
of public control (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 601), with institutions that are more “dispute
resolving” or more “policy implementing” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 286),
it will be useful in what follows to describe the dimension in terms of favouring facilitation
(reducing the risk of public expropriation) or coordination (reducing the risk of private
expropriation) (compare Milhaupt and Pistor 2008, 6-8). Among these quasi-efficient
institutions, the efficient alternative minimizes total social costs (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003,
600).
Though this centering of institutional efficiency qua cost minimization joined a long tradition of
economic analysis (e.g., Williamson 1981; North 1990), Shleifer’s framework did more than
rearticulate prior frames which use efficiency as both the criterion of desirable reform and the
index of actual institutional change. The touchstone of the NCE model was the recognition that
the shape and location of the IPF varies across contexts and time periods. Accordingly, the
optimal institutional alternative must as well (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 614–15). Shleifer
argued for example that, in the United States, the New Deal’s expanded regulatory state was just
as much an efficient response to that period’s socio-economic conditions as the system
dominated by private adjudication had been before the Civil War(Glaeser and Shleifer 2003).
More notoriously, he explained structural differences between the French civilian legal system
and the English common law as reflective of cost trade-offs in the economic circumstances of
their creation—17th century (or possible 13th century) France and England, respectively (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 303–6; Glaeser and Shleifer 2002; Djankov, Glaeser,
et al. 2003, 605–6).

Figure 1. The institutional possibility frontier
Source: (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 599)
While LOT identified the optimal solution to a given policy challenge, in a given context with
the feasible option that would minimize social costs in that context, Shleifer’s conclusions
flowed neither from a context-sensitive analysis of feasible alternatives nor from comparisons of
their relative cost-benefit trade-offs.
Instead, his arguments primarily used the IPF as an interpretive heuristic in an explanatory
scheme that exemplifies what Gordon (1984) calls evolutionary functionalism. Shleifer’s starting
presumption was that, all else being equal, prevailing institutions in a given context have
persevered over alternatives because they are more efficient. He posited, for example, that the
New Deal’s regulatory institutions arose because they offered an efficient way to manage the rise
of the robber barons and the expansion of the railroads (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 606–7).
Shleifer’s scheme offered a striking twist on the approach to institutional change long dominant
among economists, which casts institutions as the outcome of an evolutionary search conditioned
on the minimization of costs (Alchian 1950; Williamson 1981). To wit, his scheme was much
more ecumenical about evolutionary mechanisms. “Politics” had long been the bête noir of
economic approaches to institutional change (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 612), with public
policy—regulation, planning, and government intervention—cast as unnatural factors disrupting
the efficient institutional equilibria that would otherwise evolve naturally out of private action.
Shleifer, by contrast, proposed that political processes might actually be among the mechanisms
that push societies toward efficiency. Efficient institutions might result, he suggested,
from democratic pressures, from the influence of growth-seeking interest groups such as
merchants, from a Coasean negotiation among the members of the elite, such as the Magna
Carta or the American Constitutional bargain, or from the evolutionary process of long
term survival of the fittest institutions (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 613 (citations
omitted)).
Having denied that politics prevents movement toward efficient institutions, the heart of the NCE
framework is captured by two postulates: first, the feasibility and cost consequences of
institutional alternatives will depend on national context; second, institutions will naturally
evolve toward the best alternatives in that context.

These premises are patently at loggerheads both with Shleifer’s key causal claim, that changes to
specified legal measures will produce uniform economic effects, and with DB’s “one size fits
all” guidance. Yet the NCE framework did not wholly discard the schema that frames social
change as a result of a natural, efficiency-promoting evolution corrupted by unnatural
interference with that process. It simply rejected the distinction between private action and
politics as the summa diviso between natural (efficient) and unnatural (inefficient) change. Thus,
the remaining portions of LOT can be characterised as an effort to reconcile NCE’s baseline
premises with “one size fits all,” by specifying the mechanisms that obstruct the uptake of
efficient alternatives. The next section turns to Shleifer’s articulation of those mechanisms, and
an examination of whether that effort succeeded.
Diverse traditions, persistence, transplantation
LOT complemented the NCE framework in three ways. First, it paid closer attention to the
timescale over which institutional change occurs. On their own, the claims that institutions will
“tend to” lie on the IPF or “eventually” settle at the cost-minimizing alternative are deceptively
uninformative about the institutions prevailing in a given context. If institutional adaptations to
changing conditions take centuries rather than years, then present institutions will always remain
a patchwork of partial responses to past contexts, not a quasi-efficient response to present
circumstances (Armour et al. 2009, 1451). One of Shleifer’s key claims was that legal systems
exhibit a particularly high level of such hysteresis—what he called persistence. Once formed, the
legal system’s responses to local conditions will be relatively slow (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer 2008, 288, 307–8).
LOT’s second addition to the NCE framework, and its trademark claim, concerned institutions’
effects on one another. Crucially, Shleifer proposed that a country’s legal system exerts a
comparatively strong influence on the long-term development of its economic institutions and its
regulatory regimes.iii If the NCE framework could explain diversity in the fundamental structure
of legal traditions, only these two assumptions could account for the salience of those differences
centuries later.
LOT’s final element concerned the transplantation of legal traditions.iv LOT’s elementary
premise is that most countries’ legal systems are not the product of processes captured by the
NCE framework but should instead be understood as the product of an exogenous

“transplantation” of one of a small number of European legal traditions, as an incident of
European conquest and colonization between the 18th and early 20th centuries (La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 286).
Together, these three key premises—the persistent effect of legal traditions on legal systems, the
power of legal systems over institutional settlements, and the historical fact of transplantation—
predict that institutional practices across countries will cluster based on their shared legal origin.
Critics have shown how that this line of reasoning fails for certain countries: the home country of
each tradition, voluntary adopters of a legal tradition, countries whose legal systems draw from
multiple traditions, and cases where the legal regime in a particular policy area reflects more
recent transplantations (Pistor 2009, 1659–62; Siems 2007). But the theory’s dim illumination of
these specific contexts does not invalidate its overall explanatory power. Though the documented
correlations between legal origins and various present-day legal variables have other plausible
explanations, the correlations are robust, and LOT’s three key premises offer a credible
interpretation of them (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 609–10; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer 2008, 311–15).
Accepting LOT’s account of the link between legal traditions and legal rules, the question
remains: do these three premises buttress interpretations of economic change as a causal outcome
of targeted legal reforms? Can they underwrite “one size fits all?”
The economic relevance of legal origins: interpretation one
Shleifer’s effort to use LOT’s key premises to support his causal claims required a richer account
of how legal traditions shape institutional practices. His account of the nature of those
mechanisms was ambiguous. The basic notion is that a legal system is informed by a legal
tradition, and that this tradition in turn shapes individual laws via the approach, style, strategy
and/or attitudes it brings to bear on economic problems (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 598, 601–
3, 606, 610, 612–13; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 286–88, 293, 304–5, 307–
10, 323, 326). Examined more closely, his accounts suggest two broad understandings of a legal
system’s economic import. Where the first treats a legal tradition as ideology—a set of ideas—
the other treats a legal system as an (institutionalized) culture: a set of practices. Shleifer seems
to not have been cognizant of the importance of this distinction. For example, he occasionally
reduced culture to beliefs (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 308, 311). Although

both conceptions are discernible in his theorizing, the two are not compatible, and each offers a
distinct understanding of how changes to legal rules affect a national economy.
In the first interpretation, the legal system’s genesis births a corresponding legal ideology,
described variously in terms of “ideas about how the law and the state should work” (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 307), the “conception of how economic life…should be
organized” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 286) and “beliefs about how the law
should deal with social problems” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 308–9). In this
account, a legal tradition is accepting of, seeks out, embraces, or simply delivers institutional
settlements using a predetermined heuristic (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 610; La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 286, 307); it carries a set of preconceived notions about the right
balance between facilitation and coordination. The approach of the English common law favours
facilitation, while the French civil law favours coordination (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer 2008, 286). Those notions serve as the paradigm for the selection of institutional
responses to economic problems (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 610–11), substituting for the
adaptive process that, according to the NCE framework, would otherwise move institutions and
regulations toward their optima (Figure 2).
Figure 2 - The effect of legal tradition - interpretation 1

Source: (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 611)
Drawing on this interpretation, Shleifer emphasized that legal rules influenced by a transplanted
tradition will be less efficient than those resulting from a legal system that developed more
autonomously (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 610–11; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
2008, 324). Yet the inefficiency of transplants on its own divulges little about what an
indigenous legal system would have counterfactually selected, nor about what legal rules would
be efficient in the actual present.
At this point, Shleifer made use of the data linking particular legal traditions to particular
economic outcomes. The legal rules associated with the French civil law tradition are associated
with worse outcomes on some economic variables than those linked to the English common law
tradition (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 302). He inferred from these
associations that the French civil tradition, in general, picks out rules (i.e., locations on a

country's IPF) that lie further from the optimum than those picked out by the common law
tradition.
Even together, these pieces of the argument are not enough to support “one size fits all.” First,
this inference depends on a false equivalence between a rule's efficiency and its association with
specific economic outcomes. Though e.g. unemployment, corruption and financial market size
are important economic variables, they are not reliable indicia of aggregate social costs, that is,
of efficiency. More critically, the average distances from an optimum of conventions picked out
by the common law and civil law tradition offers little guidance about where those optima lie in
a specific country.
The keystone of the argument was one additional premise: Shleifer simply assumed that the
shape of the IPF in developing countries is systematically skewed, so that the trade-off between
dictatorship costs and disorder costs predictably places the optimum far up the IPF in the
direction of facilitative institutions (see Figure 2). This assumption appeared as a tacit bias
against coordinating institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 287, 323–24;
Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 610) but was occasionally stated in stark terms: viz the claim that,
relative to developed countries, “developing countries need less regulation” (Djankov, Glaeser,
et al. 2003, 611). The difference between the economic outcomes associated with the French
civil law tradition and those tied to the common law tradition thus works to corroborate a more
general problem of overregulation in every developing country. While “…transplantation
[always] leads to excessive intervention and regulation [i.e. over-coordination],” it specifically
does so “more so in civil than in common law countries” (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 611).
Note, if this assumption is correct, then every developing country is best off deregulating: one
size fits all.
If this efficiency interpretation of the legal origins data was right, though, one would also expect
legal origin to affect growth. As Shleifer admitted, it does not (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer 2008, 301–2). Not only does the first interpretation of LOT rests on an unmotivated
deregulatory bias. Even with that crutch, its claims are not corroborated by the available
evidence.

The economic relevance of legal origins: interpretation two
The weaknesses of the “ideology” interpretation of legal traditions may have been why Shleifer
warned that the idea of a legal system choosing the trade-off is “not quite right” (Djankov,
Glaeser, et al. 2003, 609). Perhaps the proper way to interpret Shleifer’s account of legal
traditions, in line with the broader NCE framework, is to understand traditions as embedded in
the tacit knowledge (“human capital”) of legal actors, and in the structure of the legal system. By
this interpretation, a tradition is maintained by its incorporation into a country’s “legal and
political infrastructure” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 2288, 308). It offers a
toolkit—a set of strategies, and a distinctive set of institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer 2008, 307). It is not just characterized by regulatory attitudes, but by the role and status
of judges, the allocation of fact-finding functions, the relative priority of adjudication and
codification, and systems of adjudicative review (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 605) In other
words, traditions operate not as supervening preferences, but through the institutional life of the
legal system in which they are embedded.
Viewing a country’s legal tradition as the operative logic of its legal institutions has important
consequences. Early articulations of the NCE framework left ambiguous whether each country
had a unitary IPF, that determines every optimal institution, or a distinct IPF for each area of
policy. More critically, early accounts were equivocal about the nature of the context
determining the shape and location of the IPF—what Shleifer calls civic capital. While
foregrounding long-term factor endowments and economic macro-variables, Shleifer’s account
of the relevant context tacitly acknowledged the importance of evolving characteristics of the
state and the impact of deliberate policy (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 600–601). A careful
reading thus suggests that IPFs should be understood as institution-specific, with the shape and
location of a country’s IPF in a particular area of law shaped by a context that includes the form
of other prevailing institutional settlements in that country—including the legal system.
What is thus at play in the second interpretation is not what the legal system “chooses” but which
institutional settlements its strategies support; or which are roughly consistent with the legal
tradition’s ways of doing things (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 286, 308).
Shleifer mustered evidence, for example, to show that the policy feasibility of military
conscription is conditioned by how involved in economic life a state otherwise is—and thus by

the overhead costs of putting conscription in place—a factor that varies systematically between
French civil law and common law origin countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
2008, 308; Mulligan and Shleifer 2005a; 2005b). To put it in terms of the NCE model, a legal
tradition works by influencing the shape and location of the IPF itself (Djankov, Glaeser, et al.
2003, 612).
Under the second interpretation, then, a legal tradition does not so much substitute for the
adaptive process that determines the institutional settlement as play a direct role in that process,
serving as a key element of the environment in which institutional adaptation takes place.
This interpretation of the theory implies that prevailing economic and regulatory institutions in
the present should be understood as optimal, in light of a country’s existing civic capital,
especially its legal system. At moments, Shleifer seemed to grasp the implication of his theory:
where institutional or regulatory adaptation has for some reason been incomplete, he said,
countries should pursue “‘appropriate institutions,’ those that…achieve the optimal trade-off
between dictatorship and disorder in ways compatible with each country’s level of economic
development and legal tradition” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, 324–25,
emphasis added). The “best solutions might differ across legal systems” (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer 2008, 324–25). As for causal inference, the theory gels uncomfortably with
the idea that legal reforms can be expected to have similar economic effects across different
national contexts. It suggests that prevailing laws and economic practices are both shaped by a
country’s civic capital—especially its legal system. The development of the two kinds of
variables may have been complementary, but neither can be pegged as primary. As for policy, it
completely contradicts “one size fits all”.

Conclusion
Should countries follow DB guidance? Viewed as economic inputs, regulatory reforms which
impact DB indicators are likely to have some output: law does matter. But the critique of LOT
above finds DB’s own architects advancing arguments in which the economic effect of indicatorlinked reforms—and the trade-off against other values—varies from country to country. In some
countries or circumstances, the costs and trade-offs of some DB-favoured reforms may be worth

the benefits. Unfortunately, DB scores and rankings make for poor indicators of whether, when,
or which ones.
Given the global context, many countries may nonetheless find reason to abide by project
guidance. A key finding of DB governance scholarship is that DB’s prescriptions are
operationalized through a coercive logic, turning not on direct instrumental benefit but on
reasonable fear of financial penalty for nonconformity with project dictates. Conditioning access
to aid and lending on DB performance was a founding goal of the project (Davis and Kruse
2007, 1098). Via the Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), DB scores
have presumptively influenced the allocation of IDA grants (World Bank 2018a, 13, 18, 37, 42;
Riegner 2016, 10–13). Scores have been used directly as benchmarks in IBRD loans (Brunswijck
2018) and by development agencies in donor countries, notably USAID (Davis and Kruse 2007,
1115–16; Schueth 2015). Critics have also emphasized that indicators like DB work reflexively,
by shaping the perceptions of economic actors—above all foreign investors—who policymakers
might want to influence (Perry-Kessaris 2011, 407–8; Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019).
Doshi, Kelley and Simmons (2019) have provided convincing qualitative evidence that the
decisions of elite global investors are strongly shaped by information about DB rankings.
DB’s integration into development finance regimes and its cognitive choreography of global
financial markets may convince some countries to use project guidance as a criterion for reform.
The prudence of that decision ultimately depends on the suitability of development models
beholden to the predilections of global financial markets.
Notably, these reasons for complying with DB guidance further attenuate the legitimacy of the
project’s power, rather than bolstering it.
Critical theorists sometimes take for granted that the discourses which underwrite the operation
of (oppressive) power are “always” pregnant with contradictions (Marks at 27) and, a fortiori,
that revealing those contradictions requires no more than viewing those discourses by the
appropriate lights. When we understand the instrumental knowledge deployed by projects like
DB not as a langue structured by a field of binary oppositions (Kennedy 2001) but, like this
article, as a bricolage of stylized fact, interpretive technique and unmotivated convention, it
becomes hard to hold faith that such revelations are inevitable. Deconstruction, ideology critique,

and trashing are neither necessary nor sufficient to grasp the operation of global governance.
Nonetheless, the insights produced in this case suggest that, for those who want to put in
question particular exercises of governance by knowledge in international development, the tools
of immanent critique retain significant promise. In some instances, the strongest case against
rationalisations of global power may ironically be produced by taking those rationales very
seriously indeed.
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Endnotes

i

There is an underexplored “what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger” dynamic to attacks on DB methodology. As
with two Bank-instigated reviews of DB methodology (Independent Evaluation Group 2008; Independent Doing
Business Report Review Panel 2013), the Bank has responded to concerns raised about individual measurement
decisions, indicator design, or overall transparency through continual reform that has deflated criticisms while
bolstering the project’s process legitimacy. (cf Van Den Meerssche 2018, 172–75; McHugh-Russell 2019b, 406)

ii

A new indicator concerning public procurement was to be introduced in the 2021 annual report (World Bank 2020,
3).
Though Shleifer sometimes refers to the effect of the legal system on individual legal rules (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer 2008, 291), a generous reading suggests that the issue is the effect of legal systems on regimes
and institutions broadly understood.

iii

iv

Shleifer admits that legal systems are not the only institutions that can be transplanted, but does not consider more
narrow transplants (Djankov, Glaeser, et al. 2003, 612).
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